Conventional War
Conflict & War - Conventional War
Written by Ramtanu Maitra Friday, 18 June 2010 09:30
Less than three months ago, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), unleashed amidst loud drumbeats the Operation Moshtarak. It was identified as the biggest battle of the eight-year war in the town of Marja situated in the Nad Ali district of Helmand province in southern Afghanistan. Highly impressionable foreign media persons said out loud that its outcome will reveal the chances of "success" for President Obama's revamped Afghan strategy. Three months since, little is heard of Operation Moshtarak. From time to time reports from that corner of the world assure the Westerners that the ISAF troops were doing fine in Marja, but the area has not been fully secured. Some progress is visible, but the process in achieving it was tougher and slower, it is said.

However, what cannot be denied is that the ISAF is moving in thousands of very well-equipped military to Kandahar province – a hop, skip and jump away from northern Iran. It has set up a number of forward operational bases to accommodate a surge of troops close to Iran borders. It was known at the outset that the troops will not go after the massive opium production that is now harvested in the area, but what was not known is that the troops may not fully engage the insurgents, who dominate the area.
Conflict & War - Conventional War
Last Updated on Saturday, 13 February 2010 16:37 Written by Lt Gen Asad Durrani rtd. Saturday, 13 February 2010 16:25
"Yes, I have heard that the British forces have entered

That was hundred and fifty years ago. We should have in the meantime learnt a bit more, also about getting out from Afghanistan- this eastern version of Bermuda Triangle, only this one sucks in empires and anyone who happens to be in the neighbourhood. Just the other day, Obama spelt out a framework that has all the ingredients of precisely such a strategy. Some confusion is understandable: “if the idea is to leave, then why the surge; or, conditions that could not be created in 8 years, how could they now be in one & a half”. But then exit strategy is not merely a matter of packing one’s bags and hitting the road. Like a declared doctrine, it hides more than it reveals. And indeed, it must provide sufficient space for freedom of manoeuvre. How would we have evolved one if we were asked to?
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