Nuclear Strategy & Doctrine

Nuclear Agendas - Nuclear Strategy & Doctrine

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SASFOR Position Paper One of 2006

By Brigadier. Vijai K Nair, VSM [Ph.D], in Consultation With Lieutenant General KK Hazari, PVSM, AVSM. and Dr. K Santhanam.

This analysis was written in 2006 and will be updated later in 2010 once issues involving the U.S.-Russia START, Obama's April  2010 Nuclear Summit, the April 2010 Iran Nuclear Summit, US Nuclear Posture Review and the NPT Review Conference in May 2010, and the ripples and counter ripples they cause play out.

India’s nuclear weapon strategy is predicated on a comprehensive assessment of the threat that the Indian strategic forces are expected to avert and not designed to meet any grandiose political aspiration of the moment. The debate in both the domestic and international fora tends to be fixated on doctrines, concepts and structures and systems limited to a narrow spectrum of issues whereas the strategy has to cope with the demands of a multidimensional threat that varies in nature, substance and the quarter from which it emanates. Consequently the deliberations tend to oversimplify a Byzantine potpourri of strategic imperatives resulting often in unrelated deductions that do not lend themselves to the formulation of a coherent nuclear strategy that would meet India’s short, mid and long term security imperatives.

Before addressing the threat(s) per se it is important to note that the global nuclear weapon environment has a vibrant dynamic of its own that needs recurring assessment so that the national nuclear weapons doctrine results in a nuclear strategy that can cope with the evolutionary effects of the dynamics peculiar to fielding strategic forces. Therefore the strategy has to be designed with an in built stretch potential to cope with the evolving nature of the threat. In other words the very nature of the threat is undergoing an evolution that demands a commensurate progression in strategic thought and capabilities. This progressive moderation of perceptions and abilities would be designed to meet all possible contingencies along the vertical and lateral axes so that unexpected tangential developments can be met through existing programmes.

Nuclear Agendas - Nuclear Strategy & Doctrine

After Hong Kong Reverts To China In 1997

Paper Presented By Brig Vijai K Nair at Taipei 1997

As Hong Kong will be assimilated into the People’s Republic of China [PRC] in July 1997, with certain stipulations, its security would become a part of the parent State’s security milieu and, therefore, cannot thereafter be considered in the prevailing autonomous fashion. However, its assimilation into the PRC would be a principal change in evolving dynamics with a fundamental affect on the security environment of Asia Pacific region. It is one of the first, and crucial stages in the Chinese game plan to achieve their long term Objectives. The questions that need to be examined are: What are the PRC’s national objectives and within that frame work, what next? How would China’s policies impinge on the regional and global security environment? And, therefore, appropriate responses, after the assimilation of Hong Kong, by other players to ensure stability in the region?

Consequently, this paper addresses China’s short, mid and long term national objectives within the global and regional security milieu, the impact on its national security philosophy and the ramifications of its policies on Asian Pacific security. The Paper has been divided into the following parts:

China’s strategic philosophy.

The PRC’s short, mid and long term national objectives and Policy Options on which to develop its security structures.

The global security environment after 1997.

Impact on the PRC’s national security objectives and likely strategies that would be initiated.

China’s Military Capabilities.

Conclusion.